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REVIEW: M.B.B. BISKUPSKI, THE UNITED STATES 
AND THE REBIRTH OF POLAND, 1914-1918
DORDRECHT: THE NETHERLANDS, 2012
By the turn of the 20th century, a significant wave of immigrants from Poland 
had fled their homeland as it marked over one hundred years under partition rule by 
the Austro-Hungarian, German and Russian empires. As they resettled in diaspora, 
including a significant number in the United States, they formed a significant base 
of political activity to influence other nations’ foreign policies In this scrupulously 
detailed work, M.B.B. Biskupski characterizes the activities by various civic asso-
ciations of Polonia and their leaders to raise American consciousness, first for relief 
and military support of the war-ravaged lands of Poland and then for its return to 
independence. Two key lessons emerge: despite fragmented agendas and rivalries, 
Polonia achieved its common goal of Polish independence in part due to intentional 
leadership from the Polish community; despite the impact of the United States’ for-
eign policy contributions to this outcome, its lack of strong and consistent commit-
ment to the cause meant that it was not quite the strong ally as some had perceived 
it, often frustrating the accomplishment of Polish goals. 
Built on extensive source documents in Polish and English, Biskupski pre-
sents a painstakingly detailed narrative that affirms the complexity of historical 
developments. Although not fully ordered either by chronology or topic, the au-
thor provides a compelling wealth of evidence. Cautioning against deterministic 
explanations for the outcome of Polish independence, he nevertheless reveals 
some influential factors. American Poles demonstrated similar sub-divisions as 
their international counterparts, though at times they could set those differenc-
es aside for the common good of a rebirthed Polish nation-state. Polish leaders 
helped to generate attention within Polonia and connections with the American 
government to promote their goals – for an army, for relief and for independence. 
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America responded, but sometimes with more rhetoric and symbolism than effec-
tive policy decisions and commitments. As a result of this scholarship, we have a 
much more detailed picture of the events that influenced the rebirth of the Polish 
nation-state – before, during and after the war.
Biskupski’s account of the diverse perspectives within American Polonia, in-
itially sketched in the first chapter, presents a complex picture. Contrary to some 
summary images of immigrant groups, Poles were far from a monolith of perspec-
tive and experience. Sometimes seen as a “Fourth Partition,” this population was no 
less divided than those in the land from whence they arrived.1 Individuals settling 
in the Midwest, around the Great Lakes, tended to come from the German portion 
of partitioned lands; they tended towards more clerical and economic traditionalism 
with a pro-Russia stance. Those settling along the Atlantic came from eastern lands; 
they tended towards more socialist and pro-German stances. In all, each of these 
broad groupings were very much framed by the culture and experiences of their 
emigration locations. Moreover, these multiple cleavages tended to be reinforcing 
rather than cross-cutting, save for the overarching interest in some sort of independ-
ent Poland, so there was less common ground on which to build collaboration. 
These differences were reflected in the organizations that developed within 
Polonia producing, in turn, complications to efforts to support the Polish Ques-
tion; that is, the return of Polish independence. Since the time of Alexis de Toc-
queville, observers in America have seen civic associations as a mainstay of 
generating support for political activity within the general public.2 These groups 
bring together like-minded individuals, pooling efforts collectively, magnifying 
their influence over what an average individual might accomplish. Within Po-
lonia, Biskupski catalogs the varied associations that represented interests from 
clerical (Polish Roman Catholic Union, ZPRK), to nationalist (Polish National 
Alliance, ZNP), to martial (Polish Falcons Alliance of America, ZSP) and many 
other groups.3 Throughout the text, he frames the events of the war and its reso-
lution in an independent Polish state through the vantage point of these numerous 
and sometimes competing groups, indicating the important role of grassroots par-
ticipation in these efforts.
The plethora of organizations resulted in divergent perspectives on the ends 
of a rebirthed Poland, reflecting more common ideological differences, result-
ing in an inability to tolerate the success of competing groups. These divisions 
were perpetuated by those of parallel émigré camps in Europe, particularly those 
spearheaded by Józef Piłsudski and Roman Dmowski.4 Other leaders, such as 
1 M.B.B. Biskupski, The United States and the Rebirth of Poland, 1914-18. (Dordrecht: Repub-
lic of Letters, 2012), 6-11.
2  Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, transl. Henry Reeve (Project Gutenberg, 2006), 
Volume I, Book I, Chapter XII, http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/815 (accessed: 1 July 2019).
3 Biskupski, 10-16.
4 Ibid., 17-21.
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Ignacy Jan Paderewski, likely helped to promote sustained American attention to 
their goals because of celebrity.5 However, social capital failed to bond the efforts 
across American Polonia in significant ways, despite several attempts to create 
larger umbrella organizations, such as the KON (National Defense Committee 
– Komitet Obrony Narodowej), as the ideological competition usually tended to 
rent cooperative efforts.6 As a result, the efforts by differing groups were often 
seen as competition, rather than collaboration, which likely hampered the effec-
tiveness of their work.
One of the several goals towards which Polonia worked involved repeat-
ed and faltering attempts, traced by Biskupski over several chapters, to fund 
and recruit for a Polish national army. Initial efforts began in Poland with the 
KTSSN (Temporary Coordinating Commission of Confederated Independ-
ence Parties) and RN (National Movement), and spread through connections to 
American Polonia.  Dr. Teofil Starzyński initiated efforts by the Falcons to lead 
the organizational and funding elements. Very quickly, divisions between tradi-
tionalists and the left created challenges in cooperating on this goal. A solution 
offered involved centering efforts for a Polish army in France, encouraged by 
Wacław Gąsiorowski, but faltered to lack of funding and support by the French 
government.7 A second option for conglomerating and training recruits in Can-
ada, promoted by the PCKR (Polish Central Relief Committee), would likewise 
dissolve after opportunities to fight on Polish and Russian behalf dissolved. 
Leftist efforts, aligned through the NKN (Supreme National Committee) to sup-
port the efforts in Austria also fell through.8 Anti-Semitic impulses, evident in 
Poland during the war and in clashes within America, also hindered collabora-
tive support in this area as it opened the movement to criticism of its character 
and question of its merit.9 The initiative would lose its momentum for a time. 
Efforts to create the army were also hampered by imaging of Polish ties to sub-
terfuge. Segments of the foreign press attempted an appeal to discourage Amer-
ica’s entry into the war, due to concerns of how it might impact the outcome. In 
response, the British launched campaigns, not only to discredit particular editors, 
but also to cast German Poles as agents of the European powers that ruled their 
homeland.10 Despite limited evidence of actual collusion, efforts by domestic op-
ponents of the KON, along with Allied powers, gained credibility with the larger 
public, discouraging support for the recruitment of American Poles to serve in 
the army.11
5 Ibid., 28-29.
6 Ibid., 31-32.
7 Ibid., 50-54.
8 Ibid., 59-63.
9 Ibid., 76-77.
10 Ibid., 99-104.
11 Ibid., 105-19.
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As with other developments, it took movement by other international actors 
to spur America to further action. Jan M. Horodyski would serve as mediator 
on these issues, reporting to Paderewski. After delays in agreement forming 
“Kościuszko’s Corps” within the United States army, or as contingents of noncit-
izens in Canada, the French government indicated a renewal in its own interest 
and support.12 However, it would be the transition in Russian governments in 
1917 that would lead to the authorization of the first official unit.13 Yet despite the 
formal recognition of these units, the Polish army languished, as citizens were 
not eligible to serve outside American forces and those not eligible for draft faced 
uncertain return under immigration law.
Once the United States entered the war, German and Austrian Poles became 
enemy aliens as opposed to refugees. Attempts to gain certificates of nationality for 
potential recruits were slowly addressed by the administration, showing a lack of 
awareness of the impact from the war that this population faced. Only late in the 
war was permission granted for recruiting of American Poles, along with concerted 
training efforts in several locations along the Canadian-American border.14 As the 
army’s ranks also flourished from the gathering of Poles elsewhere in the world, 
larger scale developments in the war would determine that this activity was too 
little too late for the army to make its anticipated impact.15 However, the persistent 
attention to this concern would allow for inroads on other affairs of Polonia.
When military recruitment efforts stalled earlier in the war, members of Polo-
nia turned their attention towards relief assistance, albeit, ultimately unsuccess-
fully. Polish celebrities, such as Paderewski and Henryk Sienkiewicz, made use 
of their renown to build attention to the suffering in Poland brought on by the 
war.16 Their founding of the Vevey Committee, in partnership with several others, 
dominated the relief efforts. Their pro-Russian/Entente leanings created dissatis-
faction among those aligning with Austria/ Germany, especially with its resulting 
alliance with the PCKR, and for Jews who came to America from Poland who ex-
perienced poor treatment there.17 Moreover, they undercut perceived rival efforts, 
such as the Kochańska Committee, burning bridges with others who shared a 
larger concern for the homeland.18 Ultimately, the efforts raised a meager amount 
in relation to relief efforts for other nations, at least until major organizations such 
as the Rockefeller Foundation became involved and émigré leaders convinced the 
American government to support its cause.19 
12 Ibid., 279-86.
13 Ibid., 287-90.
14 Ibid., 341-45.
15 Ibid., 349-52.
16 Ibid., 65-68.
17 Ibid., 69-76.
18 Ibid., 86-96.
19 Ibid., 124-27.
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Despite the relative lack of sustained success of the relief effort compared to 
those for other European nations, such as Belgium, Biskupski asserts that it did 
stimulate attention to the Polish cause within American society and thereby helped 
to facilitate movement on the Polish Question, which would not be resolved until 
the conclusion of the war. The devastation visited on Polish territories both by Rus-
sian and German troops produced concern within the American public and govern-
ment, especially with concerted attention to the issue in the national press. Earlier 
efforts by Erazm Piltz in establishing the Central Polish Agency (CAP), an interna-
tional body that solicited funds from American Poles, laid a foundation for action.20 
In cooperation with the Polish National Department (WN), collaboration spread 
across Polonia. That collaboration would be impacted by international develop-
ments, as the coordinated PCKR-WN successfully developed internationally while 
the NKN-KON declined; however, the dissolution of formal competition meant 
that a more coherent approach to President Wilson could occur.21
Paderewski, as the perceived diplomatic leader of the Polish cause, was suc-
cessful in gaining entrée to President Wilson’s advisor Colonel House, on this 
and other issues, though Biskupski notes that evidence is unclear as to the ex-
act extent of Paderewski’s influence on American actions.22 Despite this contact 
and America’s sympathetic rhetorical response, relief efforts would be stalled by 
the blockade of Germany, which the British initially refused to lift, in whole or 
part, without some guarantees for protections against German responses.23 After 
lengthy diplomatic machinations, American support failed to secure agreements 
with the British and German governments, as conditions in Poland remained 
grim, but facilitated some furtherance of Polish national concerns.24 Despite un-
successful efforts in ending the blockade, the United States’ displayed an open 
interest to intervene on behalf of the Polish cause. These developments would 
not have been possible without President Wilson’s openness as a leader to learn. 
In his work, Biskupski also provides a view into the evolving perspective of 
President Wilson, who went from near ignorance on Poland, Polonia and their 
cause, to a receptive ally. His prior academic work said little about Poles, and 
what there was of it was dismissive, as was his view of “hyphenated Ameri-
cans.”25 As such he alienated Polish voters in 1912.26 Held to account for his 
statements, he managed to overcome his negative reputation among this group. 
Moreover, his veto of immigration restrictions won favor among Poles for the 
20 Ibid., 160-64.
21 Ibid., 164-79.
22 Ibid., 131-40.
23 Ibid., 142-45.
24 Ibid., 145-46.
25 Ibid., 184-87, 194-96.
26 Ibid., 196-98.
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1916 election.27 Attentive to this group more closely, he would go on to insert the 
United States into the international conversation with a push for Polish independ-
ence, though not before other foreign powers officially raised the issue.
Early attempts by Austria and Germany to control the evolution of events 
produced a proclamation of November 5, 1916 establishing an as-yet-to-be deter-
mined independent Polish state; this potential outcome did not sit well with Rus-
sia, who feared the new state would align with its current enemies.28 However, 
rather than giving a positive reception to this statement, the WN agitated among 
American Polonia, claiming that it failed to deliver a true independent Poland. 
Despite counter-efforts by KON to highlight the proclamation as a positive devel-
opment, general attitudes tended to be negative.29 Wilson initially critiqued this 
proclamation to the Senate, finding it self-serving to the actors who issued it.30 He 
would later include a more specific and formal statement of support of Polish in-
dependence as his Thirteenth Point, advocating for its autonomy with sea access, 
for which America would further push once the Central Powers were cornered.31 
This assertion marked a consonance with broader administration policy towards 
facilitating democracy, as well as an alignment with the Allied powers on the 
question of Polish independence.
Once efforts finally turned to defining the borders of Poland, contestation still 
abounded as to whether to draw boundaries based on pure geography, history, 
ethnicity or other criteria. Initial considerations examined population dispersions 
based on linguistic commonality.32  Continued conversation on the importance 
of a sea-port through Danzig stretched these original criteria, resulting in five 
potential combinations of partitioned lands.33 The conversations were complicat-
ed by contested views of data from two different censuses – one conducted by 
tsarist Russia in 1897 and those by the Germans in 1916.34 Moreover, the experts 
had to balance the proposed boundaries of Poland with concerns about other eth-
nic groups; the Baltic states, along with Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus, where 
members favored restoration of those territories as part of a Russian confedera-
cy.35  But ultimately, Poland would achieve its independence, along with its sea-
port, simultaneously with the end of the war on November 11, 1918. Biskupski’s 
research reveals that the path to independence was indeed complex, shaped by 
Polonian efforts to influence American foreign policy.
27 Ibid., 200-12.
28 Ibid., 220-21.
29 Ibid., 223-24.
30 Ibid., 239-40.
31 Ibid., 328-36.
32 Ibid., 393-96.
33 Ibid., 398-405.
34 Ibid., 407-8.
35 Ibid., 409-12.
